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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT

absolute freedom of expression. Waldo v. Morrison15 presented a
case of rather strong statements by counsel for one of the parties
in a controversy over the disposition of a decedent's estate. Attorneys for the daughter had stated in a brief opposing the son's
motion for a new trial that the son "did not even have the common decency to take the time to attend his mother's funeral, and
yet has months of time to spend squeezing the last penny out of
his mother's estate" and had further referred to the son's "niggardly position" in the litigation. Justice Moise reiterated Louisiana's prior position that parties litigant and their attorneys
have only a "qualified" privilege, but did not feel that the statements made were "without probable cause" or motivated by
malice. Conceding that the statements were "inaccurate," the
court concluded that "each was pertinent to the strenuous and
bitter litigation between plaintiff and his sister... involving their
mother's succession. Furthermore, the extrinsic circumstances of
plaintiff's actions constituted probable cause for the statements
made."1 6 In short, while Louisiana does not grant an absolute
privilege to parties litigant and their attorneys, false defamatory
statements will not be actionable unless they are clearly irrelevant, or obviously unreasonable. Otherwise the propriety of the
defendant's motives will be presumed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
George W. Pugh*
FAILURE OF INSURER TO MAKE PROMPT PAYMENT OF CLAIM

Over the dissenting opinions of Justices LeBlanc and Hamiter, the Supreme Court held that the penalty provisions of R.S.
22:658 are applicable to workmen's compensation insurers. Writing the majority opinion in Wright v. National Surety Corporation,' Justice McCaleb found that an employee is an insured
within the meaning of this penal provision of the Insurance Code.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court relied heavily upon the
section of the Employer's Liability Act 2 which provides (1) that
a workmen's compensation insurance policy shall be "construed
to be a direct obligation by the insurer to the person entitled to
15. 220 La. 1006, 58 So. 2d 210 (1952).
16. 220 La. 1006, 58 So. 2d 210, 212.
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1. 221 La. 486, 59 So. 2d 695 (1952).
2. La. R.S. 1950, 23:1162.
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compensation, enforceable in his name," and (2) that no workmen's compensation insurance policy shall be issued unless it
contain a provision that the insurer agrees to make prompt payment to the person entitled to compensation.
The Wright decision makes it clear that a workmen's compensation insurer who arbitrarily, capriciously, and without
probable cause, fails to make payment within sixty days after
the "receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss," shall incur an additional liability for reasonable attorney's fees and damages in the
amount of 12 per cent. A question of course arises as to the sum
to be used as a basis in the computation of the 12 per. cent damages. In the Wright case, the court used as its basis the compensation payments then due. But no extensive consideration
was given to this problem in the opinion. R.S. 22:658 states that
the 12 per cent damages are to be computed on the "total amount
of the loss," and of course the answer to the quaere here raised
must be found in the meaning of the quoted statutory language.
It is reasonable to anticipate that future jurisprudence will clarify
this interesting point.
It is hoped that this decision will cause insurance companies
to make prompt settlement of just claims for compensation. Unless
the validity and propriety of compensation claims be quickly and
efficiently settled, then much of the raison d'6tre for the salutary
workmen's compensation legislation will have been cut away.
When will the failure to pay a compensation claim within
sixty days be "arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause?"
The answer to this question must come in part from the jurisprudence surrounding R.S. 22:658, and in part from future decisions dealing with the specific problem of workmen's compensation. Without itself providing a lengthy discussion of this point,
the instant case holds that in view of the fact that the medical
testimony showed "that the insurer was well aware.., that plaintiff was still partially, if not totally, disabled," it was "indefensible" for it to summarily stop all compensation payments.
FARm LABOR AS A HAZARDOUS OCCUPATION

In Griffin v. Catherine Sugar Company3 the court again considered the effect of a farmer's use of motor vehicles upon the
classification of his business as hazardous or nonhazardous. 4 Like
3. 219 La. 846, 54 So. 2d 121 (1951).
4. For a discussion of the cases involving the use of motor vehicles in

farming, see Malone, Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law and Practice
§ 96 (1951).
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other sugar planters similarly situated, the defendant used a
truck-trailer to transport cane cutters back and forth between
their homes and the place of employment. Plaintiff, employed as
a cane cutter, received injuries when he was en route back to
his home.
The court awarded compensation, holding that as a result of
defendant's use of the motor vehicles for the transportation of
his employees, his business of farming had come within the scope
of the act.5
Certain language in the opinion might be interpreted as
requiring that the use of the motor vehicle be a necessary incident to the business. And it was found in the instant case that
furnishing transportation was necessary to obtain sufficient help
to harvest the crop. It would be very unfortunate, however, if the
courts were to undertake to determine what is or is not necessary
to the operation of a man's business.
The court also held that the transportation furnished by
defendant was "incidental to the plaintiff's employment," that
plaintiff's employment began when he boarded the truck-trailer
at his home, and did not cease until he was returned thereto.
Thus the injuries in question arose "in the course of employment,"
for they were received while he was en route to his home via
transportation furnished by his employer.
TOTAL PERMANENT DISABILITY
In Wright v. National Surety Corporation6 the court applied
traditional principles to a problem of alleged total permanent
disability. Plaintiff had been injured while employed as the
operator of an asphalt distributor, a large mechanical device used
in surfacing blacktop roads. The court found that plaintiff's injuries permanently incapacitated him from performing the duties
of this job and the court properly held that plaintiff's total permanent disability status was not destroyed by the fact that he
could still drive an automobile or a small truck.
5. But see the dissenting opinion of Justice Hawthorne, 219 La. 846, 857,
54 So. 2d 121, 125 (1951).
6. 221 La. 486, 59 So. 2d 695 (1952).
7. See Malone, Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law and Practice
§ 273 (1951).
For another case last term involving a problem of total permanent
disability, see Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 220 La. 653, 57 So. 2d
218 (1952).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XIII

PRESCRIPTION

Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company8 presents a
liberal application of the prescriptive provisions of R.S. 23: 1209.
Plaintiff glass cutter's duties had required him to lift some
twenty thousand pounds of glass during the course of an average
working day. Over a period of years, plaintiff had had some trouble with his back, but had not lost time from work because of it.
On January 27, 1946, he experienced an acute pain in his back.
His condition was diagnosed as neuritis by his physician, and he
continued work until his regular vacation in September of that
year. At that time he was examined by an orthopedic physician
at Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore. X-rays were taken and
plaintiff was found to have a partial thinning of the fifth lumbar
intervertebral space. Upon his return, plaintiff went back to
work, and at his request was changed from cutting heavy glass
to work on light glass. On March 11, 1947, his condition forced
him to give up work altogether, and the court found that ever
since this date he had been totally permanently disabled. Suit was
filed on August 4, 1947, and defendant pleaded prescription.
The court accepted plaintiff's contention that the following
provision in R.S. 23:1209 governed: "Where the injury does not
result at the time of, or develop immediately after the accident,
the limitation shall not take effect until the expiration of one
year from the time the injury develops. .. ." The court found that
since the injury in question did not develop into total disability
until March 11, 1947, the requirements of the quoted provision
were met.
Thus the court gives a broad interpretation to the statutory language in question. Although it may have been true that
plaintiff was not totally permanently disabled until March 11,
1947, he had been "injured" and was suffering therefrom many
months prior to this date. It seems clear in the instant case that
plaintiff had done all in his power to retain his job and cure his
hurt. From the standpoint of the case at bar, the result reached
by the court was certainly desirable. It would have been most
unfortunate to have penalized plaintiff for his failure to surrender
sooner to his condition and file for total permanent disability.
8. 220 La. 653, 57 So. 2d 218 (1952).
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SALE AND RESALE

In Taylor v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company,
the Supreme Court followed the pattern laid down by decisions of
the courts of appeal with regard to certain practices in the lumbering industry. 10 Deceased had entered into an agreement for
the purchase of certain standing timber. With the help of one .or
more employees hired by him, he felled the logs with his own
equipment and the logs were hauled to defendant's lumber mill
in deceased's truck. The court found that there was an "understanding" with the lumber mill as to the length and diameter of
the logs to be accepted, and in addition that the lumber company
was not bound to accept any particular kind, quality, or quantity
of logs. The stumpage price of the logs due the landowner was
paid directly to him by the lumber company, and the balance was
turned over to deceased.
It was contended by plaintiff that deceased was either an
employee of the lumber company, or was an independent contractor. The court found that he was neither, that the above
transaction was merely a sale and resale of logs, and that hence
there was no coverage under the act. In a strongly worded dissenting opinion, Justice Moise points to testimony indicating that
the lumber company regarded the payments made to deceased
as payments for hauling the logs, and regarded the logs hauled as
logs belonging not to deceased, but to the company.
It seems to the writer that relationships such as the one here
presented fall clearly within the spirit of the act. It is hoped that
the Legislature will amend the act to provide coverage in such
cases as the one here discussed.
9. 220 La. 995, 58 So. 2d 206 (1952).
10. For a collection of cases and an excellent discussion of the problem,
see Malone, Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law and Practice § 123
(1951).

